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Abstract 
We identified two characteristics of  the impression formation process that may cause people to underestimate 
the riskiness of potential sexual partners. In Study 1,  participants were quite confident that they could 
determine whether someone was lying to them about risk-related behavior when, in reality, they could not. 
Particularly troubling was a “truth bias” that resulted in relatively high rates of truth detection, but poor lie 
detection. In Study 2, increased familiarity with a target person (who actually was HIV+) caused participants 
to lower their estimates of  the target’s riskiness, despite the fact that we explicitly warned them that the target 
might be HIV+. We suggest that such processes may fostqr the illusion of knowing one’s partner when one 
does not. 
“Know your partner.” Writing in 1986, the 
Surgeon General of  the United States is- 
sued this stern injunction to sexually active 
Americans.  Disturbed  by  evidence  that 
thousands were contracting the virus that 
causes AIDS (HIV) through sexual contact, 
he  urged  people  to  exercise  caution  in 
choosing  sexual  partners  and  to  refrain 
from engaging in unprotected sex. 
Now, almost a decade after the Surgeon 
General’s exhortation, many people have 
still not taken his message to heart. For ex- 
ample, in one sample of  college students, 
72%  were sexually active in the previous 
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year and, of  those, 44% had sex with two or 
more partners, using condoms only 25 YO of 
the time (Fisher & Misovich, 1990). Other 
researchers  have  confirmed  that  young 
Americans are continuing to engage in un- 
protected sex with multiple partners (e.g., 
Abler & Sedlacek, 1989;  DeBuono, Zinner, 
Daamen,  &  McCormack,  1990;  DiCle- 
mente, Forrest, & Mickler, 1990; Fisher & 
Fisher, 1992; Mangan, 1988; Miller, Turner, 
& Moses, 1990: Moore & Rosenthal, 1993). 
Such practices have undoubtedly  contrib- 
uted to the soaring rate of infection; recent 
estimates are that 1  of  100 adult men and 
about 1 of  800 adult women in the United 
States are now HIV+ (Levy, 19922).1 
To  many  observers, the  willingness of 
otherwise sensible young men and women 
to engage in risky sex is as astonishing as it 
is disturbing. Paradoxically, some of  the in- 
dividuals who religiously fasten their seat 
belts  before  heading  to  a  party  blithely 
1.  When we called the Centers for Disease Control on 
March 21,1995,we were informed that these figures 
still represent the centers’ best estimate of  the rates 
of HIV infection. 
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jump into bed with alluring strangers later 
that same evening. Such behavior raises a 
simple question: Why? 
In this report we offer one answer to this 
admittedly  complex question. We  suggest 
that many practitioners of  risky sex believe 
that they have considerable insight into the 
character  of  their  prospective  partners. 
Convinced that their insights make  them 
invulnerable (cf. Weinstein, 1984),  they take 
risks that they would otherwise deem un- 
acceptable. 
The Decision to Have Risky Sex 
Williams et al. (1992) conducted one of the 
first careful studies of  the rationales under- 
lying the high-risk sexual behavior of  het- 
erosexuals (see also Ingham, Woodcock, & 
Stenner, 1991; Offir, Fisher, Williams, & 
Fisher, 1993). Using a focus group method- 
ology, they studied how groups of  four to 
eight students explained their own sexual 
behaviors.  The  researchers  then  summa- 
rized  the major  sentiments that  emerged 
during the group discussions. 
Students asserted that, as long as they 
liked and were familiar with their partner, 
unprotected sex was safe. For example, one 
student explained  that “When you get to 
know the person. . . as  soon as you begin 
trusting  the  person. .  .  you  don’t  really 
have to use a condom” (p. 926). Another 
young man noted that, “I knew my partner 
really well before we had sex, so I didn’t 
have  to worry  about her  sexual history” 
(Williams et al., 1992,  p. 926). These reports 
suggest that some students have taken the 
US. Surgeon General’s “know your part- 
ner” mandate at face value. 
We corroborated and extended the find- 
ings of Williams et al. (1992) in a recent pilot 
study. We  asked 56 college students to list 
what  they  would  look  for  if  concerned 
about contracting AIDS from a potential 
sexual partner. As did Williams et al., we 
discovered that many students (36%) men- 
tioned how well they knew their partner. In 
fact, familiarity was  second  in  frequency 
only to the sexual background of  the pro- 
spective partner (64%). Students were also 
quite concerned with the potential partner’s 
honesty (30%), as well as what their partner 
had  to say about his or her latest  health 
exam (23%), condom and drug use (21% 
and 19%,respectively),  and virginity (14%). 
Note that the primary source of  infor- 
mation about all of  these risk factors (e.g., 
previous sexual activity, drug use, health, 
etc.) is the potential partner. This is poten- 
tially problematic because those who enter 
the sexual marketplace will probably be re- 
luctant to divulge factors that would iden- 
tify them as risky and may even lie about 
their sexual history (e.g., Cochran & Mays, 
1990). This means that lie-detection ability 
may play  a crucial role in knowing one’s 
partner, with unskilled lie detectors being 
deceived. 
Lie Detection in Social Interaction 
Although  people  generally  have  trouble 
forming objectively accurate images of one 
another  (for  reviews, see  Hogarth,  1975; 
Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982;  Nisbett 
&  Ross,  1980; Swann,  1984; Tversky  & 
Kahneman, 1971, 1973, 1974),  lie detection 
seems to be an area of particular weakness. 
Researchers  have  shown  repeatedly  that 
people’s ability to detect lies hovers around 
chance  or slightly  above  (e.g.,  DePaulo, 
Stone, & Lassiter, 1985; Kraut, 1980; Zuck- 
erman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). Even 
professional  lie  catchers  perform  quite 
modestly  in  this  arena  (e.g., DePaulo  & 
Pfeifer, 1986;  Ekman, 1981;  Kohnken, 1987; 
Kraut & Poe, 1980). 
Despite people’s dismal track record as 
lie  detectors, their  confidence within this 
domain  runs  high  (e.g., DePaulo  et  al., 
1985). Moreover, the more contact people 
have with targets, the more confident they 
become-despite  the fact that increased fa- 
miliarity does not necessarily improve ac- 
curacy  (e.g.,  Buller,  1988;  DePaulo  & 
Pfeifer, 1986; McCornack & Levine, 1990; 
McCornack  & Parks, 1986; for  a  related 
study  involving  clinicians’ perceptions  of 
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Having said this, we  acknowledge that 
people may be unusually adept in detecting 
lies about AIDS-related  issues. After all, 
the media’s extensive coverage of  the epi- 
demic has presumably made people more 
wary  of  potential  sexual  partners.  Such 
wariness may improve lie detection by en- 
couraging people to attend to channels of 
communication that are difficult to control 
(and thus diagnostic), such as tone of voice 
(Zuckerman, Spiegel, DePaulo, & Rosen- 
thal, 1982). In principle, then, it is possible 
that the AIDS epidemic has served to bol- 
ster lie-detection abilities by fostering sus- 
picion. We tested this possibility in Study 1. 
Study 1:  Detection of Lies Related to 
Risky Behavior 
To determine how well people can detect 
lies related to AIDS risk status, we had col- 
lege students ask fellow students (targets) a 
series of questions regarding their risky be- 
havior. Targets lied half of  the time, To de- 
termine if prior interaction improves lie de- 
tection, we had some participants interact 
with  targets  before  the lie-detection  ses- 
sion. We  examined  the  ability of  partici- 
pants to detect lies, as well as their impres- 
sions of targets. 
Method 
Participants 
The participants, 50 males and 53 females, 
took part in this study for credit in their 
introductory psychology class. The targets, 
who  were  students  enrolled  in  an  inde- 
pendent  research  class, had the option of 
becoming  involved  in  several  unrelated 
studies. To simulate heterosexual dating en- 
counters,  we  always  paired  participants 
with targets of  the opposite sex. 
Procedure 
Constructing  low-  and  high-risk  response 
profiles.  Three  males  and  three  females 
served as targets. All had been interviewed 
early in the semester and told that the ex- 
periment would require them to respond to 
a series of  questions about their sexual be- 
havior in a truthful and nontruthful fashion. 
We reassured them that the only person who 
would  have  access  to information  about 
their true responses was the project coordi- 
nator, a female graduate student in her thir- 
ties. All expressed comfort with this task. We 
made no effort to recruit targets who were 
particularly good or bad liars, nor did we of- 
fer them any training in how to lie success- 
fully. All targets remained blind to the na- 
ture and purposes of the study until we had 
completed data collection. 
Targets first answered a series of  eight 
questions regarding their sexual histories: 
(1) Do  you know of anyone who has AIDS? 
(2) Have you been tested for AIDS? (3) 
Have you ever had a partner who used IV 
drugs? (4) Have you ever used IV drugs? 
(5)  What is the usual length of  your sexual 
relationships?  (6) How often do you use 
condoms  during  sexual  intercourse?  (7) 
How  many partners  have you  had  inter- 
course with? (8) Since you have been sexu- 
ally  active, how  frequently have  you  en- 
gaged in sexual intercourse? 
We approached the task of  creating one 
high- and one low-risk profile for each tar- 
get  by  first  having  each  person  provide 
truthful answers to each of  the eight ques- 
tions. Answers usually consisted of  two to 
three sentences. Two raters examined each 
target’s responses and identified the four 
highest risk  answers and the four  lowest 
risk answers.  To create the high-risk profile, 
we took the four highest risk answers and 
had  the target  lie to the four remaining 
questions in a manner that fostered the per- 
ception of  riskiness. To  create the low-risk 
profile, we  took  the four lowest risk  an- 
swers and had  the target  lie to the four 
remaining questions in a manner that mini- 
mized his or her apparent risk. According 
to this scheme, then, the low-risk lies were 
the most serious threats to the health of the 
participants, followed by high-risk truths (if 
they were not perceived as such). 
The foregoing procedure was designed 
to produce  all combinations of  high- and 
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In virtually all cases, the resulting profiles 
seemed coherent and believable (for some 
example  answers,  see  Appendix  A).  In 
those instances in which an answer seemed 
incongruous or unbelievable, we modified 
the set by  substituting a high-risk answer 
for  a low-risk answer  or vice versa. One 
consequence of  this procedure was that no 
low-risk lies were told to question 4 and no 
high-risk lies were told to question 6. 
The considerable variety of sexual expe- 
riences and risk-related activities of the tar- 
gets produced a wide variation in the se- 
quencing of  lies and truths in the low- and 
high-risk conditions (the exact sequence we 
used is available from the first author). We 
randomly assigned participants to the high- 
or low-risk condition. The risk manipula- 
tion proved effective, as indicated by  the 
fact that participants rated “high-risk” tar- 
gets as being riskier than “low-risk” targets, 
F (1,101) = 5.82,~  < .02. 
The  manipulation of  familiarity. The experi- 
menter introduced the experiment as an ef- 
fort to find out how people form impres- 
sions of  others and get to know them. She 
explained further that the participant would 
be required to discuss some sexual topics. 
After  this  introduction, participants  in 
the no-interaction control condition simply 
sat alone quietly for 10 minutes. In contrast, 
participants in the interaction condition had 
a  10-minute getting-acquainted  conversa- 
tion with a person who was introduced as an- 
other introductory psychology student (ac- 
tually  the target). The getting-acquainted 
conversation was completely unstructured; 
usually the topic was course work,leisure ac- 
tivities,  and the like. At no  point did the con- 
versation drift to  AIDS or sexual behavior. 
After the 10-minute interaction, the ex- 
perimenter  asked the target to leave the 
room with her for additional instructions. 
The pair returned shortly thereafter and the 
lie-detection interview began. 
The lie-detection interview. In both the no- 
interaction  condition  and  the  interaction 
condition, the experimenter explained that 
the participant would be conducting a brief 
interview that featured eight questions. The 
experimenter instructed the participant  to 
ask each question, listen to the target’s re- 
ply, and then answer two questions about 
the  target’s  reply.  First,  the  participant 
guessed whether the target had lied or told 
the truth. Then, the participant  indicated 
how likely it was that his or her guess was 
correct on a scale ranging from 0% to 100%. 
The experimenter noted that the target 
would be lying some of  the time and then 
left the room. Upon completion of  the in- 
terview,  participants  privately  completed 
the  post-interview  questionnaire.  On  9- 
point scales, they indicated how much they 
liked the target, how well they thought they 
had  gotten to know the target, and  how 
similar the target was to them. 
Results and Discussion 
Overall accuracy 
We calculated the number of  times partici- 
pants accurately detected a lie or truth rela- 
tive to the number of times they failed to do 
so over all eight trials. Overall, they guessed 
correctly 51.9% of  the time, which is  not 
different from chance, F < 1. This poor per- 
formance was equally evident in the inter- 
action and no-interaction conditions, F <  1. 
In addition, accuracy was low regardless of 
the time of the semester that we conducted 
this research, F < 1, thus indicating that the 
low rates  of  accuracy were  not  due to a 
tendency for targets to become better liars 
over the course of  the semester. 
Despite their ihability to detect lies, how- 
ever, participants believed that they were 
quite capable within this domain. In fact, 
they estimated that they had correctly iden- 
tified the target’s response as a lie or truth 
fully 70% of  the time. Such high levels of 
confidence, contrasted against their inabil- 
ity to identify lies, amounted to consider- 
able overconfidence,  F (1,100) = 78.21, p < 
.001. 
The poor  performance  of  our  partici- 
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gullibility. That is, despite the fact that we 
explicitly warned  participants  that targets 
would sometimes lie to them (an advantage 
that lie detectors often do not enjoy), they 
assumed that the target was telling the truth 
68.4%  of  the  time  (the  actual  rate  was 
50%). This “truth bias” was statistically re- 
liable, t (202) = 11.1  1  ,p < .002, and was just 
as evident in the interaction condition as it 
was in the no-interaction condition, F < 1. 
Presumably, this tendency to assume that 
people are telling the truth reflects the fact 
that, in  naturally  occurring settings, most 
people speak the truth most  of  the time 
(e.g., Grice, 1975). Indeed, researchers have 
shown that this truth bias is a widespread 
phenomenon (e.g., DePaulo et al., 1985). 
Lie detection, truth detection, and accuracy 
in the high- and low-risk conditions 
Ability to detect lies or truths could con- 
tribute to the overall accuracy scores dis- 
cussed  above.  For  people  interested  in 
avoiding AIDS, however, these two forms 
of  accuracy are not  equal: It is far more 
important to recognize a lie that makes a 
risky target seem safe (lie detection) than it 
is to recognize a truth that makes a safe 
target seem safe (truth detection). Unfortu- 
nately, the presence of  the “truth bias” sug- 
gests that participants were better truth de- 
tectors  than  they  were  lie  detectors.  A 
direct examination of the relevant data sup- 
ported this conclusion. Whereas truth de- 
tection was a respectable 70.1%, lie detec- 
tion  was  a  considerably  more  modest 
33.7%, F (1, 102) = 108.40,~  < .001. This 
same pattern held within both the low- and 
high-risk  conditions, wherein  participants 
performed roughly twice as well in detect- 
ing truths (78.3% and 61.5%, respectively; 
F(1,101) = 12.97,~  = .0005) as compared 
to lies (36.3% and 31.0%, respectively;  F (1, 
101) = 1.17, n.s.) 
Overall accuracy was greater in the low- 
as  compared  to  the  high-risk  conditions 
(57.3% and 46.3%; respectively, F (1, 101) 
=  11.22, p  < .002). Conceivably, partici- 
pants remained more attentive to targets in 
the  low-risk  condition  because  none  of 
their responses discounted them as possible 
dates. In the high-risk condition, however, 
one  high-risk  answer  may  have  been 
enough to disqualify them from considera- 
tion. Details regarding the effects of  order, 
target, and their interaction appear in Ap- 
pendices B and C. 
Impressions of the target 
Those who interacted with the target before 
the lie-detection session liked that target 
more than those who did not, F (1,96) = 
17.62,  p  < .001 (Xs =  7.43  and  6.51, re- 
spectively), and they felt that they had got- 
ten to know the target better, F  (1,96) = 
14.43,~  < .001 (Xs  = 4.65 and 3.53, respec- 
tively). Interacting  did  not  increase  per- 
ceived similarity to the target, however, F 
(1,96) = 1.55,n.s. 
These effects may seem surprising, given 
that interacting with the target did not di- 
minish judgments of riskiness on the meas- 
ures of  lie detection. This probably reflects 
the fact that participants made each truth/lie 
judgment  immediately  after  receiving an 
answer to each  question. This procedure 
surely focused their attention onto the an- 
swer itself and away from thoughts of their 
interaction with the target. Such a focus also 
makes sense in light of  the fact that the tar- 
gets’  answers  to  questions  about  sexual 
riskiness were obviously more diagnostic of 
sexual riskiness than the information that 
targets received in the interaction. 
Gender effects 
Overall, men and women performed on a 
par with one another. Closer examination 
of  the data, however, revealed that gender 
interacted with the manipulation of  riski- 
ness, whether we examined lie detection, F 
(1,99) = 4.77,~  <  .04, truth detection, F(1, 
99) = 7.57,~  < .008, or overall accuracy, F 
(1, 99) = 13.42,  p  < .0005. The pattern of 
means was similar for all three measures. 
Males  outperformed females in  the  low- 
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tion (Ms = 44.2 and 28.2, respectively) and 
overall accuracy (Ms  = 63 and 51.9, respec- 
tively), Fs (1,51) > 5.42,~~  < .03. Females 
outperformed males in the high-risk condi- 
tions  on truth  detection  (Ms = 70.2 and 
52.1 ,  respectively) and overall accuracy (Ms 
= 51.9 and 40.1, respectively), Fs (1,48) > 
7.29,~s  < .004. Therefore, when paired with 
targets  of  the  opposite sex, men  outper- 
formed women in detecting lies, but women 
were better than men in detecting truths. 
The vulnerability of  women to the lies of 
men is particularly troubling when one con- 
siders that their male partners may lie to 
them as a means of  luring them into bed. 
We will have more to say about these find- 
ings in the general discussion section. 
In summary, the results of  Study 1  sug- 
gest that participants had no idea when tar- 
gets  were  lying  to  them.  Moreover,  al- 
though  interacting  with the target before 
the lie-detection  session bolstered  partici- 
pant’s feeling that she or he knew the tar- 
get, it did nothing to improve lie-detection 
ability.  These findings point to another pos- 
sible problem with the “know your partner” 
strategy. If  increased  familiarity fosters a 
feeling of  knowing one’s partner without a 
concomitant  increase  in  the  accuracy of 
their  impressions, then,  as  people  get  to 
know  one another, they  may  become  in- 
creasingly convinced that their partners are 
uninfected even if  this is untrue. We tested 
this possibility in Study 2. 
Study 2 
Past research suggests two independent rea- 
sons why increased familiarity with a person 
may reduce that person’s apparent riskiness. 
Research on the effects of “mere exposure” 
(e.g., Zajonc, 1968) has suggested that sim- 
ply being exposed to a neutral or positive 
stimulus makes it more “perceptually flu- 
ent” (Jacoby & Kelley, 1987), and fluency 
can, in turn, be misattributed to stimulus at- 
tributes such as  “likable” (see Bornstein, 
1989; Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1994.) In a 
similar fashion, increased fluency could also 
promote perceptions of physical health. AI- 
ternatively, familiarity may reduce apparent 
riskiness by  triggering an overgeneraliza- 
tion process. For example, learning that  a 
target person has “normal” life experiences 
might trigger an implicit personality theory 
(e.g., Schneider, 1973) that leads perceivers 
to conclude that the target is “normal” in all 
respects-including  HIV status. 
To test these possibilities,  we had partici- 
pants view a videotape of  a target person. 
In the baseline control condition, partici- 
pants saw the target momentarily. In the 
mere-exposure condition, they saw the tar- 
get for a minute. In the familiarity condi- 
tion, they witnessed the target discuss her 
background and interests for a minute. 
We  also included two  additional com- 
parison  conditions to assess sensitivity to 
diagnostic  (i.e.,  AIDS-relevant)  informa- 
tion. In  the  diagnostic condition, partici- 
pants witnessed the target give a 1-minute 
account of  her infection with the AIDS vi- 
rus. Participants in the familiarity/diagnos- 
tic condition witnessed a tape that included 
the material in both the familiarity and di- 
agnostic conditions. In all conditions, after 
viewing  the  tape,  participants  rated  the 
probability that the target was HIV+, as 
well as how much they liked her, thought 
that they knew her, and felt similar to her. 
Two  additional features  of  our  design 
deserve  comment. First, we  assumed that 
people  would  be  quite unaware  of-and 
thus unable to correct for-the  processes 
through  which  familiarity  would  reduce 
perceived  risk.  To  provide  a  relatively 
stringent  test  of  this  possibility,  before 
making their  ratings, participants  learned 
that there was a 50-50  chance that the tar- 
get in the videotape was HIV+. We  rea- 
soned  that  this  information  would  make 
them particularly wary of  extraneous influ- 
ences  that  might  distract  them  from  the 
truth. Second, to test the possibility that an 
HIV+  person  might  exhibit  some  ex- 
tremely  subtle  cues  regarding  their  risk 
status, we selected a target who was HIV+ 
(but who showed no obvious signs of  being 
ill). Dangerous illusions and AIDS  179 
Method 
Participants 
The subjects,  75  males and 82 females at the 
University of  Texas at Austin, participated 
for credit in their introductory psychology 
class. As there were no main or interactive 
effects of  gender, we will not discuss this 
variable any further. 
Procedure 
The experimenter introduced participants 
to a study of  impression formation. He ex- 
plained  that  the  participants  would  be 
forming an impression of someone who had 
been videotaped in a previous experiment. 
Videotape presentation. Participants  saw a 
videotape of  an attractive female who was 
HIV+. Participants witnessed either (a) a 
still picture of the target for 2 seconds (con- 
trol);  (b)  the  same  picture  for 1 minute 
(mere exposure); (c) a l-minute video in 
which the target discussed innocuous infor- 
mation about her background and interests 
(familiarity);  (4)  an  emotional  l-minute 
video in which the target discussed how she 
contracted the HIV virus and how it had 
changed her life (diagnostic); or (5)  a 2-min- 
ute video that included the discussion of 
background  and interests, followed by  the 
discussion of  how she contracted the HIV 
virus and how it changed her life (familiar- 
ity/diagnostic). A transcript of  the video in 
the  familiarity  and  diagnostic  conditions 
can be found in Appendix D. (The original 
design also included a second baseline con- 
trol in which an HIV+ male was viewed for 
2 or 60 seconds. Impressions of  the male 
stimulus person were virtually identical to 
impressions of the female target.) 
Post-questionnaire.  After  presenting  the 
videotape, the experimenter noted that “we 
have vidoetapes of  several target persons 
and half of  them are HIV+.” He then had 
participants rate the probability that the tar- 
get was HIV+ on a scale ranging from 0% to 
100%. In addition, participants  also indi- 
cated, on 9-point scales, (1) how much they 
liked the target, (2) how well they thought 
they had gotten to know the target, and (3) 
how similar the target was to them. 
Results 
Did exposure to, or familiarity with, the tar- 
get reduce her apparent riskiness? An over- 
all analysis of  variance (ANOVA) of  esti- 
mates of  riskiness revealed a reliable effect 
of  our manipulation, F (4,102) = 6.67,~  < 
.001. The means displayed in column 1 of 
Table 1  indicate that participants in the fa- 
miliarity condition perceived the target as 
less likely to have HIV than those in the 
control group. In contrast, participants  in 
the diagnostic condition rated the target as 
more likely to have HIV than did those in 
the control group. Finally, participants  in 
Table 1. Study 2: Impact of  familiarity and mere exposure on 
perceptions of  a risky target 
Probability target  Got To 
is HIV+  Know  Liking 
Baseline control  50.3b  1.59,  5.09, 
Mere exposure  49.7b  1.93,  5.04, 
Familiarity  36.3,  3.67b  5.86,b 
Diagnostic  65.3,  3.33b  5.86,b 
Familiarity/Diagnostic  60.2,b  4.14b  6.32b 
Note: Common subscripts within columns indicate that means are equal according to a 
two-tailed t-test with an alpha of  .05. 1x0  W. B. Swann, Jr., D. H. Silvera, and C.  U. Proske 
the mere-exposure condition  and  the fa- 
miliarity/diagnostic condition did not differ 
from controls. 
As can be seen in column 2 of  Table 1, 
our  manipulation influenced  participants’ 
ratings of  how well they knew the target, F 
(4,101) = 14.66,~  < .001, The means show 
that participants felt that they got to know 
the target more in the familiarity, diagnos- 
tic,  and  familiarityldiagnostic  conditions 
than in the control and mere-exposure con- 
ditions. A  similar, albeit  slightly weaker, 
pattern emerged when we examined liking 
for the target, F (4,103) = 3.21,~  < .02 (see 
column 3  of  Table 1).  Our manipulations 
had no impact on perceived similarity,  F = 
1.46, n.s. Finally, there were no main or in- 
teractive  effects  of  gender in  any of  the 
analyses. 
We  were  somewhat  surprised  that 
merely being exposed to a target person had 
no impact on perceived riskiness. Although 
this may mean that mere exposure does not 
influence  perceptions of  HIV riskiness, it 
may also reflect our decision to depart from 
the standard mere-exposure  manipulation 
in an effort to ensure that our manipulation 
of  mere exposure paralleled our manipula- 
tion  of  familiarity. Conceivably, a slightly 
different  manipulation  of  mere  exposure 
may have been more effective.  For example, 
mere-exposure  manipulations  are  usually 
much briefer than ours; indeed, longer ex- 
posure times seem to diminish the effective- 
ness  of  such  manipulations  (Bornstein, 
1989). Also, mere-exposure manipulations 
often consist of  presenting stimuli repeat- 
edly rather than for a single extended expo- 
sure as we employed. 
Whereas mere  exposure to the targets 
did not reduce the target’s apparent riski- 
ness, familiarity with their background did. 
In a sense, this finding is reassuring. That is, 
our participants were clearly basing their 
judgments  on  a  certain  logic  (“Hearing 
someone tell me about herself makes me 
better  understand  her”).  Unfortunately, 
their logic was flawed because such infor- 
mation does not necessarily bear any rela- 
tion to that person’s HIV status. 
Of  course, the fact that information pre- 
sented in the familiarity condition lowered 
perceptions of HIV riskiness raises the pos- 
sibility that this information was related to 
HIV risk. To  check this possibility, we had 
an  independent  group  of  39  participants 
rate the extent to which each of  the state- 
ments  made  in  the  familiarity  condition 
(see Appendix D) influenced whether they 
thought that the speaker was HIV+ on 3- 
point scales (A = reduces HIV risk; B = no 
effect; C = increases HIV risk). We  then 
employed  a  Kolmogorov-Smirnov good- 
ness-of-€it  test with a criterion ofp < .25 for 
rejection of  the null hypothesis (that items 
did not affect AIDS risk). This procedure 
led us to delete two items from the tape: “I 
grew up in a small town in Maine” and “My 
family was  upper middle class” (p  values 
were between .1 and .2). When we  had a 
fresh group of  17 participants view the new 
tape, their  responses  did  not  differ from 
those who participated  in  the original fa- 
miliarity condition: all Fs < 1. This finding 
laid to rest our concern that some of  the 
information  presented  in  the  familiarity 
condition was diagnostic of HIV risk. 
Our findings suggest that  people base 
their assessments of  riskiness on a “what is 
familiar is  safe” assumption-an  assump- 
tion that is as untrue in  many real-world 
contexts as it was in our experimental con- 
text. To be sure, our findings do suggest that 
diagnostic information may counter the ef- 
fect of  familiarity:  participants in the famili- 
arity/diagnostic conditions rated the target 
as more risky than did those in the familiar- 
ity condition. Nevertheless, even when the 
target tearfully recounted how the HIV vi- 
rus had  changed her life, participants  as- 
signed probabilities of  only 65% and 60% 
to her having the virus (in the diagnostic 
and  familiarity/diagnostic  conditions,  re- 
spectively). To be sure, the fact that we told 
subjects that there was a 50-50  chance that 
the speaker was HIV+ may have contrib- 
uted to this effect. Nevertheless, the abso- 
lute magnitude of  adjustment in the diag- 
nostic  conditions  (10%  to  15%)  was  no 
greater than it was in the familiarity condi- Dangerous illusions and AIDS  181 
tion (14%) in which they received exclu- 
sively  nondiagnostic  information.  Appar- 
ently, even when confronted with direct evi- 
dence of  infection, people are reluctant to 
conclude that someone who looks perfectly 
normal and healthy could be infected with 
the HIV virus. 
Discussion 
The  AIDS epidemic  has  placed  sexually 
active persons  in  an unenviable  position. 
Abstinence,  the  most  reliable  means  of 
avoiding infection, has garnered few sup- 
porters.  The  next  safest  route-condom 
use-has  fared  only  slightly  better  (e.g., 
Aronson, Fried, & Stone, 1991). Instead, 
most people seem to have chosen to con- 
tinue having unprotected  sex, while reas- 
suring  themselves  that  they  “know  their 
partner.” 
Our research was designed to illuminate 
several processes that might influence the 
effectiveness of  this “know your partner” 
strategy. Study 1  was based on the assump- 
tion that, even if  people are able to over- 
come the embarrassment and anxiety asso- 
ciated  with  inquiring  about  potential 
partners’ risk status, their partners may lie 
to them (Cochran & Mays, 1990).  Our find- 
ings suggest that such lies may be effective, 
for our participants were unable to detect 
them. This is important, because it means 
that people interested in assessing the riski- 
ness of  their partners may be unable to dis- 
tinguish nondiagnostic lies from diagnostic 
truths. Considered  together  with  the fact 
that people base their judgments of  riski- 
ness on what potential partners say about 
themselves  (as  in  our  pilot  investigation 
and the Williams et al., 1992, study), these 
data seem especially troubling. 
Skeptics could argue that participants in 
Study 1  were handicapped by the fact that 
they scarcely knew the person who lied to 
them. People who know one another quite 
well, they might argue, can easily tell if  their 
partners are lying to them. Although this 
argument is plausible in principle, relevant 
data undermine it. For example, our find- 
ings show that, although  interacting  with 
the target before the lie-detection session 
tended to convince participants that they 
knew the target, it did nothing to improve 
lie  detection.  Furthermore,  researchers 
have found that, as people become more 
involved with one another,  their confidence 
in their  ability to detect lies goes up, but 
their  actual lie-detection ability either re- 
mains  stable  or  actually  declines  (e.g., 
Buller, 1988; Knapp, 1984; McCornack & 
Levine, 1990; McCornack  & Parks, 1986, 
1990; but see also Brandt, Miller, & Hock- 
ing, 1980). 
Why  are people no better at detecting 
the lies of  those  whom  they  know well? 
Conceivably, as people become better ac- 
quainted, increments in trust makes them 
less vigilant, thus impairing their ability to 
detect lies. Such diminutions in  vigilance 
may  be  even  more  exaggerated  when  it 
comes to intimate relationships because of 
an unwillingness to associate a lover with a 
fatal disease. For example, one participant 
in the study by  Williams et al. (1992) re- 
marked  that  “Because  I  love  her. . . it’s 
kind of hard to think [about AIDS]”(p. 926). 
Whatever the source of  this lack of  vigi- 
lance and associated inability to detect lies, 
heterosexual  women  may  be  particularly 
susceptible to it. We  found that, although 
women and men were equal to one another 
in overall accuracy, men sometimes outper- 
formed  women  in  detecting  lies,  while 
women  sometimes  excelled  in  detecting 
truths.  Such  a  tendency, in  combination 
with a tendency for men to use lies as a 
strategy of  seduction, may heighten the risk 
at which women are placed. 
The results of  Study 2 offer yet another 
reason why getting to know a partner may 
make it difficult to recognize that partner as 
risky. Merely hearing the target share a few 
innocuous facts about herself (but not sim- 
ply seeing her for a while) diminished the 
apparent riskiness of  the target and led to 
the perception that the target was not in- 
fected with the AIDS virus. This tendency 
to  use  familiarity to make judgments  of 
healthiness could lead to a false sense of 182  W.  B. Swann, Jr., D. H. Silvera, and C.  U. Proske 
security. Furthermore, when coupled with 
an inability to distinguish lies from truths, 
this tendency could conceivably cause peo- 
ple to perceive an unrelenting liar as pro- 
gressively less risky over time. 
Implications 
Past studies of  impression formation have 
suggested that people have great difficulty 
at forming accurate images of  one another 
(e.g.,  Nisbett  &  Ross,  1980; Tversky  & 
Kahneman, 1974).  Some have critiqued such 
conclusions by noting that they are based 
almost exclusively on the results of studies in 
which participants are asked to make judg- 
ments about issues or people that they do 
not care about. If  one wants to know how 
accurate people  really  are, the  argument 
goes, one must up the ante by having people 
make judgments that matter to them. 
Although  there are surely instances in 
which raising motivation will  foster  accu- 
racy  (e.g., Tetlock, 1987), we  suggest that 
this will probably be true only if  people are 
able to monitor and properly analyze the 
process  under  consideration.  In  our  re- 
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APPENDIX  A 
Examples of Answers to Questions in 
Study 1 
(2)  “No, I hate blood tests. Plus, the guys 
I’ve been with have been nice looking, 
High risk 
- 
normal  guys-I  can’t  imagine  them 
having. AIDS.” 
Y 
(1) “Since I’ve been in college I’ve met two 
people who had the virus.  A close family 
friend recently died of  AIDS; my uncle 
died two years ago because of AIDS he 
contracted as a homosexual.” 
(3)  “Yes, I used to date a girl back in Vir- 
ginia who used IV drugs. Now, whether 
or not she used them on a regular basis 
I’m not sure. She just happened to take 184  W.  B. Swann, Jr., D. H. Silvera, and C. U. Proske 
me  to  a  party  once where  some  ac- 
quaintances of  hers were shooting up. 
That’s where  1 first  saw her  use  IV 
drugs.”  who has AIDS.” 
Lowrisk 
(1) “No, I’ve never met anyone personally 
(4)  “Yeah, I tried  it  when  I was  in high 
school. My friends and I kind of  went 
through a ‘we’ll try anything’ stage-it 
was really crazy now that I think back 
on it.” 
(5) “In high school, my relationships lasted 
about four months. Since I’ve been in 
college,  I’ve  experienced  a  couple 
(about six) one-night stands. My sopho- 
more year  I  had  a serious boyfriend 
that lasted about eight months.” 
(6)  “I’ve only used condoms on a few occa- 
sions when the girl has insisted. Person- 
ally I do not like the way condoms feel, 
and I don’t seem to be able to ejaculate 
with them.” 
(7)  “The total number  is  about twelve- 
this includes my teenage years in high 
school and my freshman year in college 
where  I  had  a  couple  of  one-night 
stands.” 
(8)  “Well, ever since I’ve been sexually ac- 
tive I’ve had sex basically whenever I 
could get it. When the opportunity pre- 
sents itself I figure I might as well take 
advantage of  it because not only do I 
really enjoy sex, but I never know when 
I may get to engage in it again. 
(2) “No, I never felt I really need to be- 
cause I’m in a monogamous relation- 
ship. My boyfriend had a lot of  blood 
work done a while back when he devel- 
oped an ulcer and he tested negative 
for AIDS. 
(3)  “No, never. . . at least that I know of.’’ 
(4)  “No, putting a needle in myself  really 
grosses me out, plus I think you can get 
addicted really quickly.” 
(5) “SO  far, I’ve only had one other partner 
besides my  boyfriend and we’ve been 
going out for three years.” 
(6)  “I always use condoms during sexual 
intercourse. Not only do I like to avoid 
the risk of  contracting a STD, but I re- 
ally don’t want to deal with impregnat- 
ing some girl.” 
(7) “I’ve had two partners.” 
(8)  “Since I’ve been  sexually active I’ve 
had  sexual intercourse usually  about 
once a week on average with the girls I 
seriously dated.” A
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APPENDIX D 
Transcript of Tape used in Study 2 
Familiarity 
I had a lot of  friends when I was in junior 
high  and  grade  school-a  lot  of  friends. 
We’d have slumber parties and go shopping 
and play with dolls. I really loved dolls. We 
were all athletic. I hung out with the jocks 
and stuff, and I was into field hockey and 
horseback riding and all kinds of  things like 
that-and  the whole social part of  it. I’ve 
had about a thousand jobs since age 15-it’s 
been three years. (laughs). All kinds of res- 
taurant work. I worked in pet stores-I  like 
animals. 
Diagnostic 
I slept with a guy when I was 15.’We dis- 
cussed birth control; we didn’t discuss con- 
dom use. I found out a week after being 
exposed to the virus by  him that he was 
infected. I was told by many people, includ- 
ing my aunt, who is a registered nurse, that 
the chances were one in a million through 
three or four encounters that I would be- 
come  infected.  It’s  just  like  such  crap 
(laughs), but, uhm, that’s what most people 
believed then. So I didn’t expect a positive 
result. I really didn’t. We all have that whole 
immortality wall that we put up. I remem- 
ber feeling, when I first found out, “I’m  15 
years old and I don’t want to die.” And I 
remember screaming it to my parents. 